Rumor spreading on online social media is presenting a significant threat to society of post-truth epoch. Extensive efforts have been devoted to rumor identification and debunking, assuming that a specific rumor propagation is a single event network and neglecting possible interdependence between different rumor cascades. Here we study the collective propagation of multiple rumors, and surprisingly find a network of users that repeatedly participate in different rumor cascades. Though these repetitive users demonstrate minor difference at the level of single propagation network, they are found to form a significantly more intensive collaboration network from multiple rumor cascades compared to news propagation. The clique-like cluster formed by repetitive rumor spreaders can serve as a high quality feature for rumor identification and blocking targets for rumor prevention. Our findings can provide a better understanding of rumor spread by viewing multiple rumor propagations as one interacting rumor ecosystem, and suggest novel methods for distinguishing and mitigation based on rumor spreading history.
Although this rumor has been proven false, its rapid spreading and initial adoption as a fact by investors had substantial impact, resulting in a loss of $9 billion market value 11 . Rumor propagation can undermine the basic value of modern society networked by the mutual belief. According to the World Economic Forum, dis-intermediated circumstances unfortunately facilitate the spread of conspiracy theories, misinformation and rumors, which present one of the primary threats in our modern society [12] [13] .
With the recent explosion of new media channels, such as Facebook and Twitter, the identification and prevention of rumors became much more difficult. Thus, understanding the mechanisms of rumor spreading in online social media has attracted much efforts, developing various approaches such as model-based simulations including the well-presented Daley Kendall (DK) model 14 . Further studies consider various propagation characteristics on networks of diverse topologies [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . Epidemic models have been also pervasively employed in modeling rumor cascades in terms of constructing estimators for rumor sources or understanding the impact of network structures [20] [21] [22] . Later, with the pervasive permeation of social media and the continuous accumulation of rumor-related propagation footprints, data-driven solutions become possible and popular [23] [24] [25] . Recent studies have demonstrated the existence of echo chamber in rumor spread, i.e., homogeneous clusters that users interact mainly within similar kind of content [26] [27] . Polarized users have been found significantly different in consuming scientific-like or conspiracy-like messages 28 . To combat these rumor cascades, different methods have been proposed. For example, measures of information credibility have been developed for filtering out rumors 29 , where both content and prorogation network have been used as features in rumor detection [30] [31] [32] . Meanwhile, based on digital traces collected from Facebook and Snopes, recent studies found that a rumor might cascade for weeks or months, and then become popular again through an external jolt 8 . Rumor prevention can be modeled as the minimization of 'bad' influence through identifying a subset of individuals that can be convinced to adopt the 'good' 33 . Unfortunately, it is found that debunking efforts seem ineffective in many rumor propagations 34 , while some debunking efforts may even reinforce the strength of rumor propagation.
In the study of rumor dynamics, most previous efforts roughly simplified the rumor propagation into single processes, neglecting the fact that different rumors might be disseminated interdependently by the same group of users, over the online social network. We argue here that a more systematic and realistic view could be established through integrating the different single rumor's cascades into collective multiple 4 interactions. Hence in the present study, based on empirical dataset collected from Weibo, one of the most trended social media in China, the interactions between different rumor retweeting networks (or news retweeting networks), due to repetitive spreaders, are thoroughly investigated. It is found that repetitive users participating in the rumor propagation show the trace of stronger collaboration than repetitive users in the propagation of authentic messages, which essentially helps the penetration of rumors in social media. These repetitive spreaders evolve into clique-like clusters forming a multilayer network, offering a novel proxy for rumor identification and blocking. Our findings based on analyzing collective social dynamics provide a broader perspective of rumor spreading understanding, which may enhance existing knowledge that emphasis semantic or propagation features of single cascades.
Results
Repetitive spreaders in rumor propagation. For each tweet in social media, either rumor or news, its propagation trace could be modeled as a retweeting network. A repetitive user is defined as a node participating in more than one retweeting network, as demonstrated in Fig 1(a) . Intuitively, activeness (defined as R, see Methods for if two key nodes appear in the same original propagation network, we add an edge between these two nodes accordingly in the C network. This consideration is based on possible crowdturfing behavior that malicious users may be organized to enhance the rumor propagation through disguising themselves as weakly coupled ordinary users 39 .
Surprisingly, we find in Fig 3b that The key repetitive users not only show fast integration from multi-cascades of rumors, but also have more concurrence probably due to higher coordination among them in a single propagation event. As shown in Fig. 3(c) , connections between key repetitive users increase much faster in rumor than that in fact, suggesting that on average each key user will have more partners of other key users in a given propagation network.
As a result, it is seen in Fig 3(d) that the distance between these key nodes in the rumor collaboration network is much smaller than that of news, demonstrating the trace of organized behavior due to intensive collaboration between k users in rumor
propagation. This is further demonstrated in Fig 3(e) that, while for news these highly collaborative users form gradually modular sub-structures 40 , rumor key nodes are becoming a densely connected single group rapidly. For further properties of the C networks see Fig. S4 .
Prediction and mitigation of rumor propagation based on key nodes. Hundreds of thousands of different rumors have been found in online social networks 7 . Facing such big data of rumor cascades, it remains challenging how to generate useful information from these historical datasets for combating future rumors. Once we accumulate a fraction of rumor propagation data, it becomes possible to identify the key repetitive users from these interconnected propagation network and build their collaboration network, which will bring new features for distinguishing between rumors and news. To detect the influence of key nodes, we define R k as the relative size of the branches of the k nodes (see Methods) in a given propagation network and find R k can be useful feature to distinguish rumors from facts. It is shown in Fig 4(a) that the probability of a given propagation network to belong to rumors is increasing fast with increasing R k . Probability of being a rumor approaches 1.0 for R k above 0.1.
The distribution of R k can be seen in Fig. S5 , showing clearly that key nodes in rumors have typically larger R k , thus more influential. Moreover, with the evolution of C network, we calculate the giant component G (as shown in Fig. S4a ) of their collaboration network as the number of propagation networks (n i ) increases. When we use G/n i for a given propagation network shown in Fig. 4b , it is found to be even a better distinction between rumors and news.
Once we have a method to identify the susceptible rumors based on key nodes or other features, one can use it to perform a real-time mitigation by blocking potential influential spreaders. It is generally difficult to identify initiators of rumors at early stages, however, blocking the intensifiers in the propagation process might effectively weaken the spreading of rumors and avoid further bursts of rumor spread. When we remove a certain fraction of nodes in a given propagation network, the resulting giant component of network can measure the effect of different mitigation strategies, as shown in Fig. 5 . Here we compare the case where the nodes removal based on their R values (from high R to low R), with a random removal of the same fraction. It is seen in Fig. 5a that the removal of key nodes in rumor propagation networks generates a much larger damage compared to random removal. The damage made by removing key nodes in rumor is also much larger than that in news propagation (compare Figs.   5a and 5b). Note that this happens despite of the fact that the structural properties such as out-degree distribution are similar for key nodes of rumor and news cascades, as seen in Fig. 2c . Thus, the reason for the higher impact of key nodes in rumors compared to news, is mostly due to their significant differences in collective effect from the network of networks that can better mitigate the rumor cascades. This points towards those nodes playing an important role in multiple cascades, which can serve as an effective option in the comprehensive combat against rumor propagations.
Discussion
On one hand, rumors are low-cost and low-tech communication weapons that can be used by anyone to disrupt the efforts of businesses, civil affairs, nation or other credit systems. On the other hand, rumors, as a collective 'intelligence' process, have been evolving and improving themselves due to the game process 41 together with the debunking efforts 42 . With the increasing prevention abilities, rumors that survive, are becoming smarter than before, and are more difficult to distinguish, identify and eliminate. While this interaction and evolution is expected to become much more represented and resilient in the future ecology of rumors, our goal is to uncover its evolution features in order to enable effective debunking. One possibility of eliminating such evolving rumors is to study deep into their "DNA", and identifying their fundamental mechanisms of reproduction. Here we find that among multiple rumor networks for different topics, there is a small group of special users (key nodes) showing trace of intensive collaboration in the different propagation networks, and thus, serving as a motor for rumor reproduction. This small group connecting multiple rumor cascades shows strong interactions inside the group (Fig.   3 ), while in single networks they behave similar to real news (Fig. 2c) . Our results
show that repetitive users could provide useful features for rumor identification and mitigation. Therein, this group of key repetitive users provides us an opportunity to recognize, distinguish and even prevent the rumor evolution and their collective propagation, by viewing the different rumors as a whole network of networks. These overlapped nodes are named repetitive users. To quantify the overlap level, i.e., the activeness of a repetitive user, denoted as R, is defined as the node appearance
Methods
where n is the total number of propagation networks that the user attends, N is the total number of networks in the employed data set (for rumor N is 407 networks and 426 for news networks). Moreover, we define the nodes with the top 0.1% highest activeness as key nodes, which present higher appearance frequency. In rumor propagation there are 302 key nodes in total and 477 key nodes in news propagation.
We define the correlation of activeness between the connected nodes as follows:
for each connected pair of nodes in multiple propagation networks, R 1 and R 2 are the R of both ends of an edge.
Propagation features. As for rumor identification (see Fig. 4 )，in each network, R k is defined as
where N k is the number of key nodes, N bs is branch size of key nodes in the network and N net is the total number of nodes that attend in the given network. It is worth noting that in social media, the branch size can measure a spreader's influence of contagion, because any message posted by the spreader will be firstly pushed to all their branched size and higher branch size implies more retweets in later propagations.
Furthermore, probability of a random network belongs to rumor networks in each R k section (P) is defined as
where n ri is the number of rumor networks in i th R k section and N r is the total number of rumor networks, n fi is the number of news networks in i th section and N f is the total number of news networks. For each key node, we first calculate its average layer in all networks that it attends and then obtain a probability distribution of the average layer of key nodes. We also present the layer distribution of ordinary nodes (all nodes except for key nodes) in the inset. (b) PDF of of key nodes, is defined as the interval between post-time of a key node and creating time of the corresponding network. Similarly, of each key node is also averaged over the multiple networks it attends. PDF of of ordinary nodes is also shown in the inset. Here we only consider the non-official news and rumor. For each R k section, we calculate the probability (P) that a random network belongs to rumor network. Three vertical lines divide the whole dataset (rumor and non-official news) into 4 parts with equal number of networks sorted by R k values. For example, "25%" stands for having 25% of the networks in this area. (b) Size of collaborative networks. We calculate G/n i as the C network grows when the number of networks increases, where G is the giant component fraction of the C network and n i is the number of added propagation networks. Here we only consider the non-official news and rumor in the C network growing process. 
